Re: [請益] 寡占市場的問題...(急)

看板Economics (經濟學)作者bearching (Pandora`s Box)時間17年前 (2009/03/14 21:15)推噓0(0推 0噓 0→)

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※ 引述《SsimpleLlove ( ilobimd)》之銘言： : 下下禮拜要參加研究所考試了，這邊有一個問題困擾我 : 懇請各位能幫幫我。。。 : －－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－ : Two firms compete by choosing price. their demand functions are : Q1=20-P1+P2 and Q2=20+P1-P2 : where P1 and P2 are the price charged by each firm respectively and : Q1 and Q2 are the resulting demands. Note that the demand for each good : depends only on the difference in price; if the two firms : colluded and set the same price, they could make that price as : high as they want, and earn infinite profits. Marginal costs are zero. : 1. Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the : resulting Nash equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, : how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? : 2. Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price. : What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, : and what will its profit be? : 這是在講秦柏霖勾結是嗎??? 怎麼算啊???? 這個都是在說Bertrand價格競爭第一題有點類似Cournot競爭第二題類似Stockelberg競爭一樣都是先算兩家的利潤=TR-TC 然後再分別對兩家的利潤用P微分(第一家用P1 第二家用P2) 可以得到兩家的反應函數類似P1=a+bP2這樣的函數第一題是用兩個反應函數解聯立就可以得到第二題因為說第一家先第二家後，所以第一家在做決策的時候要把第二家的決策考慮進去，簡單說就是把第二家的反應函數P2=a+bP1帶進去第一家的利潤裡面的P2 然後對再對第一家的利潤用P1微分，就解出來了~ -- ※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 59.105.30.74